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This paper examines the dynamic pricing problem of a durable-good monopolist when
product quality is endogenous. It is shown that the relationship between the ﬁrm’s quality
choice and the time-inconsistency problem crucially depends on how the unit production cost
varies with quality. The monopolist may use quality as a strategic commitment device to
eliminate the time-inconsistency problem. Also, it may have incentives to choose a quality
higher or lower than the optimal commitment level. This contrasts with the planned obso-
lescence literature where durable goods monopolists reduces durability (often regarded as a
measure of quality) to mitigate the time-inconsistency problem.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An important proposition in economic literature on durable-good monopolies is that a seller
faces a problem of time inconsistency (Coase (1972), Bulow (1982), and others). The problem
arises because durable goods sold in the future aﬀect the future value of units sold today, and
in the absence of the ability to commit to future prices the monopolist does not internalize this
externality. There have been numerous investigations on the robustness of the result in the
∗Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staﬀs ST5 5BG, UK. Email: j.h.hahn@econ.keele.ac.uk
1literature. Bond and Samuelson (1984) show that depreciation and replacement sales reduce the
monopolist’s tendency to cut price. Kahn (1986) shows a similar result when the monopolist
faces an upward-sloping marginal cost schedule. Also, there have been many studies analyz-
ing means and practices durable-good monopolists can employ to overcome or mitigate the
time-inconsistency problem, notably leasing (Bulow, 1982), planned obsolescence (Bulow, 1986;
Waldman, 1993), contractual provisions such as best-price provisions or most-favored-customer
clauses (Butz, 1990), and more recently product-line extension using quality diﬀerentiation
(Hahn, 2002; Inderst, 2002; Takeyama, 2002).
However, one of the aspects that received little attention in this literature is how the time-
inconsistency result is aﬀected when quality of product is chosen endogenously by the ﬁrm, as
in real world durable goods markets. In the standard durable-goods monopoly model, quality of
product is exogenous and therefore its eﬀect on ﬁrm’s strategic behavior is ignored. We analyze
a durable-good monopoly model in which the ﬁrm is allowed to choose quality as well as prices.
T h em a i nq u e s t i o n st ob ea s k e di nt h i sn e ws e t u pa r e
• How does endogenizing quality aﬀect the time-inconsistency problem?
• How does the time-inconsistency problem, if it is present, aﬀect the monopolist’s optimal
choice of quality?
We consider a three-period dynamic game where a single-product monopolist ﬁrst decides on
the quality of good in period 0, and then chooses the price of the good sequentially over periods
1 and 2. The focus of our analysis is to investigate how the monopolist’s decision on product
quality is related to the time-inconsistency problem, and how the optimal quality diﬀers from
the one chosen under commitment to future prices. We show that the relationship critically
depends on how the unit product cost varies with quality. The main ﬁndings of the analysis are
as follows.
With endogenous quality the durable-goods monopolist may be naturally immune to the
time-inconsistency problem. This happens when the average cost at the optimal commitment
quality is high (i.e. the elasticity of scale of quality is small) enough for the ﬁrm to ﬁnd selling
the goods to low-valuation consumers in period 2 unproﬁtable. This result is quite diﬀerent from
the one observed in the standard durable-goods monopoly model with an exogenous quality and
a constant unit cost. In the standard model the ﬁrm does not face time-inconsistency problems
if the absolute level of the constant unit cost is suﬃciently high (see Bulow, 1982 for example),
2while here the relevance of the time-inconsistency problem depends on the shape of the unit cost
function of quality. For instance, there is no time-inconsistency problem if the elasticity of scale
of quality is suﬃciently small even if the unit product cost itself is high.
As the average unit cost at the optimal commitment quality gets smaller (i.e. the elasticity
of scale of quality increases) the time-inconsistency problem becomes relevant (i.e. the ﬁrm
has the incentive to sell the good to low-valuation consumers in period 2). The ﬁrm’s optimal
reaction to the problem diﬀers depending on the level of the elasticity of scale of quality. If
it is relatively small (but still high enough for time consistency to be relevant), the ﬁrm ﬁnds
it optimal to eliminate the time-inconsistency problem by choosing a quality higher than the
optimal commitment level (therefore increasing the average unit cost of production). So, the
monopolist uses quality as a strategic device of committing to no future sales, similar to the
well-known burning-his-factory story in the standard durable-goods monopoly. Here, the ﬁrm
also increases price up to a level where the equilibrium demand is smaller than the one in the
commitment regime. As the elasticity of scale of quality increases further, increasing quality up
to the point where the time-consistency problem disappears is too costly and the ﬁrm chooses
to sell the goods in period 2. But, still the monopolist may have incentives to increase or
decrease quality relative to the optimal commitment level. With second-period sales, the ﬁrm’s
decision on quality depends on the levels of the two marginal types and the relative importance
(distribution) of the ﬁrst and second-period demands. The second-period marginal type is more
sensitive to the change of the average unit cost than the ﬁrst-period marginal type, i.e. the
second-period marginal type decreases more rapidly than the ﬁrst-period marginal type as the
average unit cost gets smaller. So, if the elasticity of scale of quality is very large (i.e. the average
unit cost is suﬃciently small at the optimal commitment quality), the equilibrium second-period
marginal type is too low so that the ﬁrm chooses a quality lower than the optimal commitment
level. If the elasticity of scale of quality is in an intermediate level, however, the ﬁrm increases
quality, partially mitigating the time-inconsistency problem.
Our result is in contrast with the planned obsolescence literature (Bulow, 1986; Waldman,
1993) in which durable goods monopolists tends to reduce durability (often regarded as a measure
of product quality) to mitigate the time-inconsistency problem. This result is also reminiscent
of the reverse Averch-Johnson eﬀect established by Bulow (1982), i.e. durable-good monopolists
may invest less in ﬁxed costs in order to keep their marginal costs high (a signal of lower future
output and thus high future prices).
32 The model
We incorporate a quality dimension into the classical durable-goods monopoly model of Bulow
(1982). There is a monopolist selling durable goods over two periods. The good is characterized
by a one-dimensional quality index q ≥ 0. The unit cost of production is constant and is given by
c(q), where c(0) = 0,c 0(·) > 0, and c00(·) > 0. There is no economies of scale or learning-by-doing
over time. Before production begins (say, in period 0) the ﬁrm chooses quality of the good (q)
it will sell in periods 1 and 2. We assume constant ﬁxed costs of production independent of
quality, and also assume that the ﬁxed cost corresponding to producing goods of a single quality
(such as costs of setting up production lines) is too large so that the ﬁrm has no incentives to
produce multiple qualities or alter the quality of the good later. So, we conﬁne ourselves to
a single-quality monopolist, i.e. the ﬁrm is constrained to produce goods of the single quality
determined in period 0 and the quality choice is virtually irreversible.
On the demand side, there are a large number of consumers who live two periods. The total
number of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers have unit demands, and each consumer is
indexed by a type parameter θ. The per-period (non-discounted) gross surplus a type-θ consumer
derives from the consumption of a good of quality q is given by
v(θ)=θq.
So, the marginal utility of quality is linear and increasing in type parameter θ.C o n s u m e rt y p e
is private information. The good purchased and used during period 1 can be used again in
period 2 without depreciation. After period 2 the good becomes obsolete or is replaced by a
new product. Consumers purchase if they are indiﬀerent between buying and not buying. We
assume that there is no upgrade or technological innovation during the time horizon considered.
Consumers and the ﬁrm have a common discount factor denoted δ ∈ [0,1]. All agents have
complete and perfect information (except consumer type), and have perfect foresight on future
outcomes. The solution concept we are using is subgame perfection.
3T w o t y p e s o f b u y e r s
Consumers come in two types: θ ∈ {θl,θ h} where θh >θ l >c 0(0). There is a continuum of
consumers for each type with mass µ for type θh and 1 − µ for type θl. So, consumers act as a
4price taker and all the bargaining power is given to the ﬁrm.1
First, consider the benchmark case where the ﬁrm can commit to future prices. The ﬁrm
has two options. If it sells to only type-h consumers at a high price the total proﬁti s
πh ≡ max
q : µ[(1 + δ)θhq − c(q)],
and the optimal quality qh is given by the ﬁrst order condition,
(1 + δ)θh = c0(qh). (1)
If it sells to both types of consumers at a low price the total proﬁti s
πl ≡ max
q :[ ( 1+δ)θlq − c(q)],
and the optimal quality ql is given by
(1 + δ)θl = c0(ql). (2)
Note that both proﬁt functions are concave, and therefore qh and ql given above are the true
optimal quality in each case. The ﬁrm will choose to serve type-h consumers only if πh ≥ πl,i . e .
µ[(1 + δ)θhqh − c(qh)] ≥ (1 + δ)θlql − c(ql), (3)
and choose to serve both types of consumers otherwise.
It is easily observed that qh >q l from the convexity of c(·). In order to highlight the
time-consistency issue in the classical durable-goods monopoly pricing, we will focus on the
cases where condition (3) holds, i.e. the ﬁrm optimally chooses the intertemporal sales rather
than the immediate market clearing and achieves the optimal commitment proﬁt πh with the
optimal quality qh. Condition (3) simply says that the marginal utility of quality is suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated between the two types of consumers and or the proportion of type-h consumers is
suﬃciently large relative to type-l consumers.
Next, consider the case where the ﬁrm cannot commit to future prices. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne e q
such that θle q = c(e q), which denotes the level of quality where the price the ﬁrm can charge for a
type-l consumer is just equal to the unit cost of production. Note that if the ﬁrm chooses q ≥ e q
1The assumption of a continuum of buyers rules out the perfectly discriminating equilibria proposed by Bagnoli,
Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989, 1995). See von der Fehr and K¨ uhn (1995) for more details on how the relative
commitment power between the seller and buyers aﬀects the equilibrium outcome.
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problem. But, for q<e q it is optimal for the ﬁrm to sell to type-l consumers in period 2,
which constrains the ﬁrst-period price the ﬁrm can charge according to the type-h consumers’
intertemporal incentive constraint,
(1 + δ)θhq − p1 ≥ δ(θh − θl)q.
Given q,t h eﬁrm’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π(q)=
(
µ[θhq + δθlq − c(q)] + δ(1 − µ)[θlq − c(q)] if q<e q
µ[θhq + δθhq − c(q)] if q ≥ e q
.
The proﬁt function is discontinuous and non-diﬀerentiable at q = e q, but it is diﬀerentiable and
concave elsewhere.2 In fact, it jumps up at q = e q.3
Now we examine the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of product quality without commitment. First,
suppose that qh ≥ e q,i . e .θl is small relative to θh and or the unit cost of production is suﬃciently
large at the optimal commitment quality (subject to condition (3)). Then, from the concavity of
the proﬁt function (except for q = e q)a n dt h ef a c tt h a t l i m
q→e q−
π(q) <π (e q)a n d l i m
q→e q−
π0(q) <π 0(e q),
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to choose the optimal commitment quality qh. In this case, there is
no time-inconsistency problem since it is optimal for the ﬁrm not to serve type-l consumers in
period 2 (θlqh <c (qh)), and therefore the ﬁrm can achieve the optimal commitment outcome
even without commitment power.
Next, suppose that qh < e q,i . e . θl is close to θh (subject to condition (3)) and or the
unit cost of production is suﬃciently small at the optimal commitment quality. Then, the
concavity of the proﬁt function in q ∈ [e q,∞] implies that lim
q→e q+
π0(e q) < 0. Also, from condition
(1), the deﬁnition of e q, the convexity of c(·), and the fact that θh >θ l we have lim
q→e q−
π0(q)=
µ[θh + δθl − c0(e q)] + δ(1 − µ)[θl − c0(e q)] < 0. So, we need to compare π(e q)a n dπ(q)w h e r eq is
such that




µ[θh + δθl − c
0(q)] + δ(1 − µ)[θl − c
0(q)] if q<e q
µ[θh + δθh − c






00(q) − δ(1 − µ)c
00(q)i f q<e q
−µc




π(q)=µ[θhe q + δθle q − c(e q)] <π (e q)=µ[θhe q + δθhe q − c(e q)].
6and the optimal quality is given by
q∗ =a r gm a x {π(e q),π(q)}.
Here, two qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria can emerge. If the optimal quality is determined at
q∗ = e q>q h, the demand is exactly the same as in the commitment case, but the ﬁrm, by
increasing quality, commits itself to not serving type-l consumers in period 2 and eﬀectively
avoids the time-inconsistency problem.4 This strategic commitment, however, comes with costs:
the optimal proﬁt π(e q) is smaller than the commitment proﬁt πh. If the optimal quality is
determined at q∗ = q, on the other hand, the ﬁrm chooses to serve type-l consumers in period 2
and therefore the total demand increases. Let us compare q with qh in this case. Recall that qh
satisﬁes condition (1). Evaluating the derivative of the proﬁt function π(·)a tq = qh,w eh a v e
π0(qh)=µ[θh + δθl − c0(qh)] + δ(1 − µ)[θl − c0(qh)] < 0.
So, it is clear that q<q h,i . e .t h eﬁrm decreases quality in this case. This is because the marginal
revenue of quality is smaller than in the commitment regime due to the expanded demand and
the time-consistency constraint. With the general cost function c(·)i ti sab i tc u m b e r s o m et o
characterize the exact situations under which the ﬁrm chooses a particular level of quality. But,
from the following numerical example we can clearly see that it depends on the structure of
the unit cost function of quality, more speciﬁcally the elasticity of scale of the technology with
respect to quality, which measures how the unit cost of production varies with quality.5
Example 1: Suppose that θh =1 ,θ l = 1
2,δ =1 ,µ = 1
2, and c(q)=qα (α>1). Note
that the parameter α is the elasticity of scale of quality of the cost function.6 From the ﬁrst-
order conditions (1) and (2), we ﬁnd that qh =( 2
α)
1
α−1 and ql =( 1
α)
1
α−1.T h e a v e r a g e c o s t
of quality is k(qh)= 2
α at qh and k(ql)= 1
α at ql, which are decreasing in α.S o , w e c a n
regard α as a (indirect) measure of the average cost of quality at the commitment equilibrium.




2 for all α>1. Also,
we have e q =( 1
2)
1
α−1. The condition for no time-inconsistency problem (qh ≥ e q) reduces to
4This demand rigidity is in fact an artifact of the two type model and is not generally true. In the next section,
using a continuous type model we characterize how the (ﬁrst-period) demand is aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s attempt of
changing quality in order to avoid the time-consistency problem.
5In the present context, the elasticity of scale of the technology measures the percent increase in cost due to
a one percent increase in quality.







α−1,w h i c hh o l d sf o rα ≤ 4. If α>4, then qh < e q and we need to compare π(e q)
and π(q)w h e r eq =(1
α)
1
α−1 <q h =(2
α)
1









and it turns out that the optimal quality is e q for α ≤ 9.8265 and q for α ≥ 9.8265.
Hence, we have three diﬀerent equilibria depending upon the parameter α.F o rα ≤ 4, the
cost function increases more steadily as quality increases, leading to a relatively high level of unit
production cost at the optimal commitment quality. In this case, there is no time-inconsistency
problem and the ﬁrm can achieve exactly the same outcome as in the commitment regime. For
4 ≤ α ≤ 9.8265, the time-inconsistency problem becomes relevant but the ﬁrm increases quality
relative to the optimal commitment level in order to avoid the time-inconsistency problem. For
α ≥ 9.8265, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to accept the time-inconsistency problem and serve
type-l consumers in period 2, but decrease quality as the marginal revenue of quality is smaller
than the commitment regime.
4 A continuum-of-types case
In this section we generalize our analysis to a situation with a continuum of consumer types.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a continuum of consumers with unit mass, and the type
parameter θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0,1].
4.1 Equilibrium with commitment
Suppose the ﬁrm can commit to prices it will charge in the future. Then, the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing policy is to sell the goods in period 1 at its (two-period) monopoly price and sell nothing
in period 2. Given quality q and price p, consumers of type θ such that (1 + δ)θq ≥ p will buy
the good in period 1 and others will not. It is convenient to solve the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization
problem in two stages. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the optimal marginal type (which is equivalent to choosing
the optimal price) for a given quality, and the optimal quality is determined later. Given q,t h e
ﬁrm chooses θ in order to maximize proﬁts:
max
θ
: q(1 − θ)[(1 + δ)θ − k(q)]
subject to 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, where k(q)=
c(q)
q is the average cost of quality at the given q.T h e
corresponding optimal price is then determined by the equation (1 + δ)θq = p. The proﬁt






for 0 <k (q) ≤ 1+δ.7




4(1+δ)[(1 + δ) − k(q)]2.
Note that the proﬁt function is quasi-concave (single-peaked) for the relevant region where





Robustness of the time-consistency problem: In order to examine the relevance of
the time-inconsistency problem when the ﬁrm can not commit to future prices, we consider the
ﬁrm’s incentive to sell the goods in period 2 after serving consumers of type greater than or equal
to θ∗ (the optimal marginal type at the commitment equilibrium) in period 1. The marginal









The ﬁrm would not face the time-inconsistency problem even without commitment if the equi-
librium quality under commitment is chosen so that serving consumers of type θ ≤ θ∗ in period
2i sn o tp r o ﬁtable, i.e.
v(θ∗) ≤ c(q∗)= ⇒ k(q∗) ≥ 1+δ
1+2δ, (6)
which simply says that the average cost of quality is suﬃciently large at the commitment equi-
librium level of quality.
This clearly shows that when quality is endogenous the relevance of the time-inconsistency
problem in durable goods monopoly crucially depends on how the unit production cost varies
with quality, and in some cases a durable-good monopolist is naturally immune to the time-
inconsistency problem. For example, for c(q)=βqα (α>1,β > 0) condition (6) holds if
7We ignore the cases of k(q) ≥ 1+δ in which the ﬁrm gets zero proﬁts.
9α ≤ 1+δ, which does not depend upon the scaling index β. This means that the condition
for no time-inconsistency problem hinges on the shape of the unit cost function of quality (i.e.
the elasticity of scale of quality) rather than its absolute level. It should be noted that this
result is quite diﬀerent from the one observed in the standard (exogenous-quality) durable-
goods monopoly model with a constant unit cost where the ﬁrm does not face time-inconsistency
problems if the constant unit cost is suﬃciently large. For example, in the two-period durable-
goods model of Bulow (1986) there is no time-inconsistency problems if the constant marginal
cost c is greater than 1+δ
1+2δ. But, here with endogenous quality the ﬁrm is immune to the
time-inconsistency problem when the average cost of quality is larger than 1+δ
1+2δ at the optimal
commitment quality, i.e. the elasticity of scale of quality is suﬃciently large, even if the unit
cost of production is very low (a low β).
4.2 Equilibrium without commitment
We now consider the monopolist’s choice of quality when the ﬁrm cannot commit to future
prices. The ﬁrm problem is to choose quality q in period 0 and a sequence of the ﬁrst-period
and second-period prices p1 and p2 in periods 1 and 2 to maximize total proﬁts, given consumers’
rational expectation about second-period outcomes. Given q and (p1,p 2), θ1 ∈ [0,1] denotes the
type of consumers who are indiﬀerent between buying in the ﬁrst period and waiting to buy in
the second period, i.e.
(1 + δ)θ1q − p1 = δ(θ1q − p2),
and similarly θ2 ∈ [0,θ 1] denotes the type of consumers who are indiﬀerent between buying in
the second period and buying nothing, i.e.
θ2q − p2 =0 .
We ﬁnd a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by solving the problem backward. It is useful
to express the monopolist’s proﬁts in terms of θ1 and θ2 rather than p1 and p2. First, given q
and θ1 the ﬁrm’s second-period problem is
max
θ2
: q(θ1 − θ2)[θ2 − k(q)]
subject to θ2 ≤ θ1.S i n c ek(·) is monotone increasing (from the convexity of c(·)), for a given q




θ1 for θ1 ≤ k(q)
1
2[θ1 + k(q)] for θ1 >k (q)
.




: q{(1 − θ1)[θ1 + δθ∗
2 − k(q)] + δ(θ1 − θ∗
2)[θ∗
2 − k(q)]}










4+δ k(q)f o r 0 <k (q) ≤ 2+δ
2+3δ
k(q)f o r 2+δ




2(1+δ)k(q)f o r 1+δ
1+2δ ≤ k(q) ≤ 1+δ
.
Plugging in the optimal marginal types, the total proﬁt is then rewritten as
π(q)=

         
         
q
4(4+δ)2{4[1 − (1 − δ)k(q)][(2 + δ)2 − (4 + δ2)k(q)]
+ δ[2 + δ − (2 + 3δ)k(q)]2}
for 0 <k (q) ≤ 2+δ
2+3δ
δq[1 − k(q)]k(q)f o r 2+δ
2+3δ ≤ k(q) ≤ 1+δ
1+2δ
q
4(1+δ)[(1 + δ) − k(q)]2 for 1+δ
1+2δ ≤ k(q) ≤ 1+δ
.
The proﬁtf u n c t i o nπ(q) is continuous and diﬀerentiable except at q = k−1( 1+δ
1+2δ)a n dq =
k−1( 2+δ
2+3δ)( k−1(·) is the inverse function of k(·)) where it is continuous but non-diﬀerentiable.
Also, note that it is quasi-concave in each of the three regions. Diﬀerentiating the proﬁt function
where it is possible, we have
π0(q)=

           
           
1
4(4+δ)2{4[1 − (1 − δ)k(q)][(2 + δ)2 − (4 + δ2)k(q)]
+ δ[2 + δ − (2 + 3δ)k(q)]2
+ qk0(q)[(32 − 24δ +3 2 δ2 +1 0 δ3)k(q) − 2(4 + δ)(4 + δ2)]}
for 0 <k (q) < 2+δ
2+3δ
δ{[1 − k(q)]k(q)+qk0(q)[1 − 2k(q)]} for 2+δ
2+3δ <k (q) < 1+δ
1+2δ
1
4(1+δ)[(1 + δ) − k(q)][(1 + δ) − k(q) − 2qk0(q)] for 1+δ
1+2δ <k (q) ≤ 1+δ
.
We now analyze how the monopolist’ optimal choice of quality is aﬀected by the lack of
commitment power, and how it is related to the structure of the unit cost function.
First, if 1+δ
1+2δ ≤ k(q∗) < 1+δ, i.e. the average cost of quality is suﬃciently high at the
optimal commitment quality, the monopolist does not face the time-consistency problem and
11can achieve exactly the same outcome as in the commitment regime. Note that this condition for
no time-inconsistency problem is identical to condition (6) derived in the previous subsection.
Second, if 2+δ
2+3δ ≤ k(q∗) < 1+δ
1+2δ, i.e. the average cost of quality at the optimal commitment
quality is in an intermediate range, the derivative of the proﬁt function evaluated at q = q∗ is




[(δ +1 )− (1 + 2δ)k(q∗)] > 0,
where the use was made of condition (5). This means that it is optimal for the monopolist
to commit to not selling in period 2 by increasing quality from the optimal commitment level.
With a continuum of consumer types we can now see how this strategic commitment using
quality aﬀects the equilibrium demand, an aspect that has not been analyzed in the previous
discrete type case. Since the convexity of c(·) implies that θ∗
1(q)=k(q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq,
the ﬁrst-period demand is smaller than the equilibrium demand in the commitment regime.
Increasing both quality and the ﬁrst-period marginal type immediately implies an increase of
the ﬁrst-period price relative to the optimal price in the commitment regime. So, in this case
the monopolist ﬁnds it proﬁtable to increase quality as well as price up to a level where the
ﬁrst-period demand is smaller than the equilibri u md e m a n di nt h ec o m m i t m e n tr e g i m ei no r d e r
to avoid the time-inconsistency problem.
Last, if 0 <k (q∗) < 2+δ
2+3δ, i.e. the average cost of quality is suﬃciently low at the optimal
commitment quality, increasing quality to commit to not selling in period 2 is too costly and
therefore the ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to accept the time-inconsistency problem and sell to
some low types of consumers in period 2. But, the monopolist may wish to increase or decrease
quality relative to the optimal commitment level. Let q denote the optimal quality in this case,
where q is given by the ﬁrst-order condition,
4[1 − (1 − δ)k(q)][(2 + δ)2 − (4 + δ2)k(q)] + δ[2 + δ − (2 + 3δ)k(q)]2
+ qk0(q)[(32 − 24δ +3 2 δ2 +1 0 δ3)k(q) − 2(4 + δ)(4 + δ2)] = 0.




So, given the quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function the monopolist will decrease quality if 0 <
k(q∗) < 1
5 and increase quality if 1
5 ≤ k(q∗) < 2+δ
2+3δ. The intuition for this result is as follows.
12The ﬁrm’s decision on quality basically depends on the levels of the two marginal types and
the relative importance (distribution) of the ﬁrst and second-period demands. In this case of
0 <k (q∗) < 2+δ











[θ1 + k(q)] = 2+δ
2(4+δ) + 6−δ
2(4+δ)k(q).
Note that the second-period marginal type is more sensitive to the level of the average unit cost
than the ﬁrst-period marginal type.8 This implies that the second-period marginal type decreases
more rapidly than the ﬁrst-period marginal type as the average unit cost gets smaller. In the
former case, with a relatively small average unit cost the equilibrium second-period marginal
type is too low so that the optimal quality is determined lower than the optimal commitment
level. In the latter case, however, the average unit cost is relatively high and therefore the ﬁrm
increases quality, partially mitigating the time-inconsistency problem.
Combining the above results leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Compared with the commitment equilibrium, the monopolist i) decreases quality
if 0 <k (q∗) < 1
5, ii) increases quality if 1
5 ≤ k(q∗) < 2+δ
2+3δ with second-period sales (still subject
to the time-inconsistency problem), iii) increases quality if 2+δ
2+3δ ≤ k(q∗) < 1+δ
1+2δ without second-
period sales (avoiding the time-inconsistency problem), and iv) oﬀers the same quality as in the
commitment case if 1+δ
1+2δ ≤ k(q) < 1+δ.
Example 2: Suppose c(q)=qα (α>1). From condition (5), the optimal commitment
quality is given by q∗ =(1+δ
2α−1)
1
α−1, which initially decreases and then increases after some
critical value of α (e.g. α ∼ = 2.6555 for δ = 1). The average unit cost at the optimal commitment
quality is then given by k(q∗)= 1+δ
2α−1, which is monotone decreasing for α>1. Recall that
α is the elasticity of scale of quality. So, the average unit cost of production at the optimal










2 ,t h eﬁrm increases quality but chooses to sell the good in period 2. If 2+δ
2+3δ ≤ 1+δ
2α−1 <
8For instance, for δ = 1 (no time discounting) the ﬁrst-period marginal type (θ
∗
2)i sc o n s t a n ti n d e p e n d e n to f
the average unit cost.
131+δ
1+2δ ⇒ 1+δ<α≤ 4+6δ+3δ2
2(2+δ) ,t h eﬁrm increases quality in order to commit to no sales in period
2 (avoiding the time-inconsistency problem). Finally, if 1+δ
1+2δ ≤ 1+δ
2α−1 < 1+δ ⇒ 1 ≤ α<1+δ,
the ﬁrm is free from the time-inconsistency problem and oﬀers the optimal commitment quality,
achieving the same outcome as in the commitment case. The following ﬁgure exhibits the range
of parameters corresponding to each of the above four cases.






























Fig 1: The optimal quality without commitment.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined how a ﬁrm’s choice of quality interacts with the time-inconsistency
problem in a durable-good monopoly framework. It has been shown that the relationship de-
pends on the structure of unit production function of quality. Durable-goods monopolists may
have incentives to raise quality in order to eliminate or ameliorate the time-consistency prob-
lem, and the equilibrium level of quality can be higher or lower than the one in the commitment
regime.
The basic model can be extended in several lines. The most demanding is probably is to
extend the model to a ﬁnite (but more than two period) or inﬁnite horizon setup. Also interesting
is to examine the robustness of the result to allowing the ﬁrm to produce multiple qualities or
alter the quality of the good later at some ﬁxed costs.
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